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COMMUNICATING ZERO-SUM PRODUCT STOCHASTIC GAMES
TRISTAN GARREC
Abstract. We study two classes of zero-sum stochastic games with compact action sets
and a finite product state space. These two classes assume a communication property on
the state spaces of the players. For strongly communicating on one side games, we prove
the existence of the uniform value. For weakly communicating on both sides games, we
prove that the asymptotic value, and therefore the uniform value, may fail to exist.
1. Introduction
1.1. Problem and contribution. In a zero-sum stochastic game, two players interact
repeatedly at discrete times, with opposite interests. At each stage, players face a zero-
sum game given by the state of nature which evolves according to the current state, and
the pair of actions players choose given the history. Therefore, the actions played at
each stage impact both the payoff today and the law of the state of nature tomorrow.
Players intend to optimize their expected overall payoff. The n-stage repeated and the λ-
discounted games are the games in which the overall payoffs are respectively the Cesàro
and Abel means of the stage payoffs. Under mild assumptions both games have a value
denoted respectively vn and vλ .
A fundamental question arising in the theory of dynamic games is the asymptotic
behavior of these values. We shall focus on the two following approaches of this issue.
The asymptotic approach studies the convergence of the values of the n-stage repeated
game and the λ-discounted game, as n goes to infinity and λ goes to 0, that is as players
become more patient. If these quantities converge and are equal, the game is said to have
an asymptotic value. The uniform approach is dedicated to the existence, for both players,
of strategies that are ε-optimal in every n-stage repeated game, provided that n is large
enough. If such strategies exist, players are able to play optimally in every game long
enough without knowing the length of the game. In that case, the game is said to have a
uniform value. These strategies are also ε-optimal in every λ-discounted game, provided
that λ is small enough. While the existence of the uniform value implies the existence of
the asymptotic value, the converse is not true.
The aim of this paper is to study the asymptotic and uniform values in two classes of
zero-sum product stochastic games. A product state space is of the formX ×Y . Moreover,
players control the transitions on their own components of the state space, that is the next
state in X only depends on the current state in X and the action of player 1, and similarly
for Y . We consider the case where X and Y are finite, and action sets are compact. The
two classes we are interested in assume a communication property on the state spaces of
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the players. These are called the strong and the weak communication properties — the
strong communication property implying the weak one.
The first class is the class of strongly communicating on one side zero-sum product
stochastic games. In such games, for one player, there exists a time T such that indepen-
dently of his choice of policy, there is a positive probability of passing from any state to
any other state in his component of the state space in exactlyT stages. This assumption,
of ergodic nature, implies that the current state of the player having the strong commu-
nication property has in the long run little importance.
The second class is the class of weakly communicating on both sides zero-sum product
stochastic games. In such games, for each player there exists a time T and a policy such
that, for any two states in their components of the state space, they can move from one
to the other with positive probability in exactlyT stages. Thus players totally control the
dynamics on their components of the state space.
Strongly communicating on one side and weakly communicating on both sides zero-
sum product stochastic games have, to our knowledge, never been studied before.
For strongly communicating on one side games, we prove the existence of the uniform
value, which does not depend on the initial state of the player having the strong commu-
nication property. Furthermore we prove that this player has ε-optimal strategies that
have a simple structure. We call them Markov periodic strategies. Under these strategies,
the action chosen at each stage does not depend on the whole history but only on the
current state and stage modulo the period. Hence they are a particular case of Markov
strategies, for which the actions chosen depend only on the current state and stage, and
are more general than stationary strategies, which only depend on the current state. Our
proof is based on a classification of the state space of the player who is not assumed to
have the strong communication property (note that if both players have it, the proof is
considerably simpler and the decomposition is actually not needed). This decomposi-
tion relies on recurrent classes induced by stationary policies. It has been introduced for
Markov Decision Processes (MDP) by Ross and Varadarajan (1991), similar classifications
have been used by Bather (1973), Solan (2003), Flesch et al. (2008). Building on that clas-
sification, we consider a family of auxiliary stochastic games and prove that they have
a uniform value independent of the initial state. Finally we build an auxiliary MDP for
the player who does not have the strong communication property, whose payoffs are the
uniform values of the previous auxiliary games. We conclude by proving that the uniform
value of the MDP is also the uniform value of the initial game.
Regarding weakly communicating on both sides games, we provide an example of a
game which does not have an asymptotic value (and hence neither has a uniform one).
Our proof is based on a reduction of this example to a simpler game of perfect information
with two absorbing and two non absorbing states introduced by Renault (2019). A key
ingredient of the non-existence of the asymptotic value is the non semi-algebraic aspect
of the action set of one player. The example in particular shows that in weakly commu-
nicating on both sides games, even if players can go from any state to any other state of
their component in finite time, they can make mistakes that are irreversible with regards
to the joint state.
1.2. Related literature. Zero-sum stochastic games were introduced by Shapley (1953)
in the finite setting (finite state and action sets), for which he proved the existence of the
value in the λ-discounted game. Mertens and Neyman (1981) proved the existence of the
uniform value. Their proof is based on the fact that the value of the λ-discounted gamehas
bounded variations in λ, as shown by Bewley and Kohlberg (1976). It is a key question
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whether the existence of the uniform value extends to non finite zero-sum stochastic
games.
This question has been answered positively for several classes of zero-sum stochastic
games with a finite state space and non finite action sets, as we consider in this paper.
For absorbing games (Mertens et al., 2009) and recursive games (Li and Sorin, 2016), the
proofs use the operator approach of Rosenberg and Sorin (2001) that relies on the Shapley
operator which entirely contains the dynamics of the game. Still for a finite state space,
Bolte et al. (2014) showed that games with semi-algebraic (or more generally definable)
transitions and actions set have a uniform value. Finally, Renault (2010) proved the exis-
tence of the uniform value in MDPs with a finite state space and arbitrary action set.
However, in the last few years, several counterexamples to the existence of the as-
ymptotic value in zero-sum stochastic games with finite state space and compact action
sets have been proposed, see (Vigeral, 2013, Sorin and Vigeral, 2015, Ziliotto, 2016b), end-
ing the long standing idea that such games had an asymptotic value. Laraki and Renault
(2017) provided such a counterexample with a product state space. As it is the case for
the counterexample presented in this paper, all these counterexamples have in common
to have non semi-algebraic transition probabilities or non semi-algebraic action sets. This
is a key element to make the value oscillate. It should be put into perspective with the
work of Bolte et al. (2014) on definable zero-sum stochastic games. Another feature these
counterexamples have in common is to have absorbing states. These states which cannot
be left once reached are incompatible be the weak communication property. This is a
major difference between previous counterexamples and the present one.
Zero-sum stochastic games on a product state space have been introduced by Altman
et al. (2005), who examined the case where each player only observes his component of
the state and his actions, and showed that these games can be solved by linear program-
ming. Flesch et al. (2008, 2009) studied equilibria in N -players finite product stochastic
games. They however considered an overall payoff which is the limit inferior of the n-
stage repeated game payoff, while we are interested in the existence of the uniform value.
Finally, Laraki and Renault (2017) showed the existence of the asymptotic value in zero-
sum product stochastic games under a strong acyclicity condition. This strong acyclicity
condition encompasses the irreversibility in the transitions of several classes of repeated
games for which the asymptotic value is known to exist. The strong acyclicity condition
is incompatible with our weak communication property. It is important to understand
in which classes of stochastic games that do not assume an irreversibility condition the
asymptotic value may exist.
Gillette (1957) introduced games in which independently of the choice of strategies,
there is a positive probability of passing from any state to any other state in exactly T
stages. He called them cyclic stochastic games. These were also investigated by Hoffman
andKarp (1966), Bewley andKohleberg (1978) andVrieze (2003). A similar assumption has
also been examined by Fudenberg and Yamamoto (2011) for games where players observe
the state and a public signal related to the actions played. However in these articles the
property is considered on the whole state space and not only on one component of a
product state space.
1.3. Organization of the paper. The article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we
describe the model of zero-sum product stochastic games and recall some elementary
facts. In Section 3 we give formal definitions of strongly and weakly communicating, and
state the two main theorems. Finally, Sections 4 and 5 are dedicated to the proofs of the
two main theorems.
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2. Preliminaries on zero-sum product stochastic games
2.1. Model and course of the game. Let X and Y be two nonempty finite sets. Let A
and B be two nonempty compact metric sets endowed with their Borel σ -algebras. Let
p : X × A → ∆(X ) and q : Y × B → ∆(Y ), be such that for all x , x ′ ∈ X and all y,y′ ∈ Y ,
p(x ′|x , ·) and q(y′ |y, ·) are continuous. ∆(X ) denotes the set of probability measures over
X , and similarly for ∆(Y ). Let u : X ×Y ×A×B → [0, 1], be such that for all (x ,y) ∈ X ×Y
and all a ∈ A and b ∈ B, u(x ,y, ·,b) and u(x ,y,a, ·) are continuous.
X is the state space of player 1, Y is the state space of player 2. A is the action set of
player 1, B is the action set of player 2. It is without loss of generality that the action
sets do not depend on the current state. p is the transition probability of player 1, q is the
transition probability of player 2. u is the payoff to player 1.
Let Γ = (X ,Y ,A,B,p,q,u). The game Γ is played in stages as follows: an initial state
(x1,y1) ∈ X × Y is given and known by the players. Inductively at stage n, knowing the
past history hn = (x1,y1,a1,b1, . . . , xn−1,yn−1,an−1,bn−1, xn,yn), player 1 and 2 simulta-
neously choose an action, respectively an ∈ A and bn ∈ B. A new state xn+1 ∈ X is
selected according to the distribution p(·|xn,an) on X and a new state yn+1 ∈ Y is se-
lected according to the distribution q(·|yn,bn) on Y . The payoff to player 1 at stage n is
un = u(xn,yn ,an,bn).
2.2. Policies and Strategies. Since the state space of the game Γ is a product of two
sets X and Y , we distinguish policies of the players, which only depend on their own
history, i.e., on their actions and component of the product state space, from strategies,
which depend on the joint history. We denote strategies and strategy sets depending on
the joint history with bold letters.
We denote the set of positive integers by ∗. For n ∈ ∗, let H 1n = X × (A × X )n−1 be
the set of histories of player 1 at stage n andH 1∞ = (A×X )∞ be the set of infinite histories.
H 1n is endowed with the product σ -algebra H
1
n , and H
1∞ with the product σ -algebra H1∞
spanned by
⋃
n≥1H1n . Let S denote the set of behavior policies of player 1 depending only
on his own history. A policy σ ∈ S is a sequence (σn)n∈∗ , where σn is a measurable map
from (H 1n,H1n) to ∆(A). A policy σ together with an initial state x ∈ X define a unique
probability distribution over H 1∞ which we denote 
x
σ . We define analogous objects for
player 2 and denote T the set of behavior policies of player 1 depending only on his own
history.
For n ∈ ∗, let Hn = X × Y × (A × B × X × Y )n−1 be the set of joint histories at stage
n and H∞ = (A × B × X × Y )∞ be the set of infinite joint histories. Hn is endowed with
the product σ -algebraHn , and H∞ with the product σ -algebraH∞ spanned by
⋃
n≥1 Hn .
Let S and T denote the sets of behavior strategies of player 1 and player 2 respectively.
A strategy σ ∈ S is a sequence (σn)n∈∗ , where σn is a measurable map from (Hn ,Hn)
to ∆(A), and likewise for T . A pair of strategies (σ ,τ ) together with an initial state (x ,y)
define a unique probability distribution over H∞ which we denote 
x,y
σ ,τ .
A strategy is a Markov strategy if the mixed action played at every stage depends
only on the current stage and state. Markov periodic strategies are Markov strategies
depending on the stage modulo the period and on the current state. Let us give a formal
definition.
Definition 2.1. For N ∈ ∗, a strategy σ of player 1 is called an N -periodic Markov
strategy if there exists (µn)n∈{1, ...,N } ∈ ∆(A)X×Y×N such that for all n ∈ ∗ and all
hn = (x1,y1,a1,b1, . . . , xn−1,yn−1,an−1,bn−1, xn,yn) ∈ Hn , σn(hn) = µn′(xn,yn), where
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n′ ∈ {1, . . . ,N } is equal to n modulo N . Markov N -periodic strategies of player 2 are
defined likewise.
Stationary strategies are Markov strategies depending only on the current state, hence
they are Markov 1-periodic strategies. Again, stationary strategies on the product state
space X × Y (elements of ∆(A)X×Y and ∆(B)X×Y for player 1 and 2 respectively), are
denoted with bold letters. Stationary policies of the players on their components of the
state space (elements of ∆(A)X and ∆(B)Y respectively) are denoted with letters that are
not bold.
Finally, a pair of stationary strategies (µ,ν ) ∈ ∆(A)X×Y × ∆(B)X×Y induces a Markov
chain (Xn,Yn)n≥1 over X × Y . A state (x ′,y′) ∈ X × Y is said to be accessible from (x ,y)
(in t stages) under (µ,ν ) if x,yµ,ν ((Xt ,Yt ) = (x ′,y′)) > 0. More generally, a property is said
to hold under (µ,ν ) if it holds for the Markov chain induced on X × Y . We use similar
vocabulary for stationary policies on X and on Y .
2.3. N -stage and λ-discounted games. For all N ∈ ∗, the N -stage game ΓN starting
in (x ,y) ∈ X × Y , is the game in which the payoff is
γN (σ ,τ )(x ,y) =
1
N
N∑
n=1

x,y
σ ,τ (un),
for all (σ ,τ ) ∈ S×T . The value of the N -stage game starting at (x ,y) is denoted vN (x ,y).
It is characterized by the following recursive equation:
vN+1(x ,y) = valµ ∈∆(A),ν ∈∆(B)
[
1
N + 1
u(x ,y, µ,ν ) + N
N + 1

x,y
µ,ν (vN )
]
, (2.1)
where
u(x ,y, µ,ν ) =
∫
A×B
u(x ,y,a,b)dµ(a)dµ(b), and

x,y
µ,ν (vN ) =
∑
x ′,y′∈X×Y
vN (x ′,y′)
∫
A×B
p(x ′|x ,a)q(y′ |y,b)dµ(a)dν (b).
Moreover, by (Sorin, 2002, proposition 5.3), both players have optimal Markov strate-
gies.
For all λ ∈ (0, 1], the λ-discounted game Γλ starting in (x ,y) ∈ X × Y , is the game in
which the payoff is
γλ(σ ,τ )(x ,y) = λ
+∞∑
n=1
(1 − λ)n−1x,yσ ,τ (un),
for all (σ ,τ ) ∈ S × T . The value of the λ-discounted game starting at (x ,y) is denoted
vλ(x ,y). It is characterized by the following fixed point equation:
vλ(x ,y) = valµ ∈∆(A),ν ∈∆(B)
[
λ · u(x ,y, µ,ν ) + (1 − λ)x,yµ,ν (vλ)
]
.
If vn and vλ converge as n goes to infinity and λ goes to 0, and the limits are equal, then
the game is said to have an asymptotic value. The Tauberian theorem of Ziliotto (2016a)
applies in this setting and the asymptotic value exists if (vλ)λ∈(0,1] converges as λ goes to
0.
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2.4. Uniform value and optimal strategies. Fix an initial state (x ,y) ∈ X × Y . Player
1 is said to uniformly guarantee v∞ ∈ [0, 1] if he has a strategy which guarantees v∞ (up
to ε) against any strategy of player 2, in any game ΓN , provided that N is large enough.
Formally,
∀ε > 0 ∃σ ∈ S ∃M ∈ ∗ ∀τ ∈ T ∀N ≥ M γN (σ ,τ )(x ,y) ≥ v∞ − ε .
And similarly for player 2. If both players guarantee v∞, then it is called the uniform value
of the game Γ starting at (x ,y).
Let ε ≥ 0. A strategy σ ∈ S is said to be (uniformly) ε-optimal for player 1 if
∃M ∈ ∗ ∀τ ∈ T ∀N ≥ M γN (σ ,τ )(x ,y) ≥ v∞ − ε .
And similarly for player 2.
The next proposition states that if one of the players plays a stationary strategy, then
the other player has an ε-optimal best response which is also stationary.
Proposition 2.2. Let µ ∈ ∆(A)X×Y be a stationary strategy of player 1 in the game Γ.
Then, for all ε > 0 there exist ν ∈ ∆(B)X×Y and M ∈ ∗ such that for all N ≥ M and all
τ ∈ T γN (µ,ν)(x ,y) ≤ γN (µ,τ )(x ,y) + ε .
Proof. Let ε > 0, µ ∈ ∆(A)X×Y and (x ,y) ∈ X × Y . When player 1 plays the stationary
strategy µ, player 2 faces a Markov decision process having a uniform value w∞, and for
which he has a uniformly ε-optimal stationary strategy ν , consult (Sorin, 2002, corollary
5.26).
Thus, there exists M ∈ ∗ such that for all N ≥ M one has γN (µ,ν )(x ,y) ≤ w∞ + ε
and for all τ ∈ T one has γN (µ,τ )(x ,y) ≥ w∞ − ε . 
3. Main results
In the present article, we examine two communication properties on state spaces of the
players. In words, a player has the strong communication property if there exists a time
T such that independently of his choice of policy (depending only on his own history),
there is a positive probability of moving from any initial state of his component of the
state space to any other state in exactlyT stages.
Definition 3.1. Player 1 has the strong communication property if there exists T ∈ ∗
such that for all policies σ ∈ S and all states x , x ′ ∈ X , one has xσ (XT = x ′) > 0.
A similar definition stands for player 2. A game is strongly communicating on one
side if at least one player has the strong communication property.
In words, a player has the weak communication property if there exists a time T and
a policy (depending only on his own history) such that, for any initial state, he can reach
any other state in his component of the state space in exactly T stages, with positive
probability.
Definition 3.2. Player 1 has the weak communication property if there exists T ∈ ∗
and a policy σ ∈ S such that for all states x , x ′ ∈ X , one has xσ (XT = x ′) > 0.
A similar definition stands for player 2. A game is weakly communicating on both
sides if both players have the weak communication property. Note that the strong com-
munication property implies the weak one.
The next simple example illustrates the notions of strong and weak communication.
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Example 3.1. In Fig. 1 below we represent the state space and transition probabilities of
player 1. The state space is X = {x ,y, z}. Transition probabilities are represented by
arrows between states. In state x player 1 chooses α ∈ A. With probability α the next
state is x and with probability 1 − α it is y. In state y (resp. z) the next state is y (resp. x )
with probability 1.
Hence if the action set A equals [0, 1], player 1 has the weak communication property
but does not have the strong communication property. Whereas ifA equals [ε, 1] for some
ε > 0, player 1 has the strong communication property.
z
x
y
1 1 − α
1
α
Figure 1. Strong and weak communication
We prove in this article the following results.
Theorem 3.3. Any strongly communicating on one side zero-sum stochastic game has a
uniform value.
Moreover, assuming player 1 has the strong communication property, the uniform value
only depends on the initial state of player 2 and for all ε > 0 player 1 has an ε-optimal
Markov periodic strategy.
Theorem 3.4. There exists a weakly communicating on both sides zero-sum product sto-
chastic game which does not admit an asymptotic value.
Remark that it is sufficient that one player has the strong communication property for
the uniform value to exist, while both players having the weak communicating property
does not ensure the existence of the asymptotic value.
The proof of Theorem 3.3 relies on a classification of the state space of the player who
is not assumed to have the strong communication property. We then consider a family
of auxiliary stochastic games and prove that they have a uniform value independent of
the initial state. Finally we build an auxiliary MDP for the player who is not assumed to
have the strong communication property, whose payoffs are the uniform values of the
previous auxiliary games. We conclude by proving that the uniform value of the MDP is
also the uniform value of the initial game.
The proof of Theorem 3.4 relies on a counterexample. We show that the Shapley equa-
tions of this game are also the Shapley equations of a simpler game with two absorbing
and two non absorbing states, for which the asymptotic value does not exist.
4. Proof of Theorem 3.3
We assume in the proof of Theorem 3.3 that player 1 has the strong communication
property.
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In Section 4.1 we decompose the state space of player 2 in L maximal communicating
sets Ci (Definition 4.1). These sets, forming a partition of Y (Proposition 4.2), allow us in
Section 4.2 to introduce L auxiliary stochastic games Γi having uniform values v
i
∞ which
do not depend on the initial state (Proposition 4.6).
In Section 4.3 we introduce a Markov Decision Process G for player 2 with the same
transition probability q as in the initial stochastic game, but with payoff vi∞ when the state
is in Ci . This MDP has a uniform value w∞, which is also the uniform value of the initial
stochastic game Γ.
In Section 4.4 we prove that player 2 uniformly guarantees w∞ in Γ (Proposition 4.7).
The idea is for player 2 to first play optimally in the MDP G (disregarding player 1) and
then to switch to an optimal strategy in one of the games Γi .
Finally in Section 4.5we prove that player 1 uniformly guaranteesw∞ (Proposition 4.10).
This is one of the main difficulties of the proof. The natural idea is for player 1 to play
optimally in each game Γi . However player 1 does not control the transitions from oneCi
to another (which may happen infinitely often). We deal with this issue by letting player
2 play a Markov periodic best response which prevents the state from jumping infinitely
often between maximal communicating sets (Lemma 4.9). We conclude showing that the
payoff this yields can also be obtained by player 2 as a limit payoff in G (Proposition 4.10).
4.1. Classification of states. The state space Y is classified in a similar way to (Ross
and Varadarajan, 1991), using recurrent classes induced by stationary policies on Y .
Definition 4.1. A subset C of Y is said to be a maximal communicating set if
i) There exists a stationary policy onY such thatC is a recurrent class of the induced
Markov chain on Y . Such a policy is said to be a stationary policy associated to
C .
ii) C is maximal, i.e., if there exists C ′ a subset of Y such that i) holds for C ′ and
C ⊆ C ′, then C ′ = C .
LetC1, . . . ,CL denote the maximal communicating sets. D denotes the set of transient
states under every stationary policy (sometimes just called transient states for short).
Remark 4.1. Player 1 having the strong communication property, there is only one max-
imal communicating set in X , which is the whole state space X itself.
Proposition 4.2 below can be found in (Ross and Varadarajan, 1991) when the action
space B is finite, since the proof is similar with a compact action space we omit it. This
result, showing that the maximal communicating sets and the set of states that are tran-
sient under any stationary policy form partition of Y , is fundamental in our proof of
Theorem 3.3 since it allows us (in the next section) to consider independent auxiliary
games over each maximal communicating set.
Proposition 4.2. {C1, . . . ,CL,D} is a partition of Y .
The two examples given below allow to show how the state space of player 2 decom-
poses in maximal communicating sets, and what behavior the state process may have
with regard to this decomposition. In particular, they show behaviors of the state process
that may happen in the compact action setting and cannot happen in the finite one.
Example 4.1. In Fig. 2 the state space of player 2 isY = {x ,y, z} and the action space is B =
[0, 1/2]. Again, the transitions probabilities are represented on the arrows between states,
e.g., playing β ∈ B in state y, the next state is x with probability β , y with probability
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x y z
1
β 1 − β − β2
β2
1
Figure 2. States, actions and transitions of player 2
1 − β − β2 and z with probability β2. The maximal communicating sets are {y} and {z}
and the set of transient states under every stationary policy is {x}.
Remark that, if the initial state is x , playing β = 1
2n
in state y at stage n ≥ 1, player 2
has a positive probability of switching infinitely often between the transient state x and
the maximal communicating set {y}. This cannot happen when the action space is finite.
In that case, for any policy of player 2, after finitely many stages the process (Yn)n≥1
remains forever in one of the maximal communicating sets with probability 1, see (Ross
and Varadarajan, 1991, lemma 2 and proposition 2).
The next example is derived from the previous one and shows another possible behav-
ior of the state process in the compact action setting.
Example 4.2. Here, see Fig. 3, the state space of player 2 is Y = {x ,y, z} and the action
space is B = [0, 1/2]. The maximal communicating sets are {x}, {y} and {z}.
x y z1 − 2α
2α
β 1 − β − β2
β2
1
Figure 3. States, actions and transitions of player 2
Again, remark that if the initial state is x , playing α = 1/2 in state x and β = 1
2n in state
y at stage n ≥ 1, player 2 has a positive probability of switching infinitely often between
maximal communicating sets {x} and {y}.
As we mentioned earlier, this behavior the state of player 2 may have gives rise to a
difficulty since player 1 cannot control the jumps of player’s 2 state between maximal
communicating sets or transient states. This difficulty is defused by letting the players
play Markov periodic strategies.
Another way of defining maximal communicating sets is via pairs of stationary strate-
gies of player 1 and 2 on X × Y , as in the following definition. Recall that a pair of
stationary strategies (µ,ν ) ∈ ∆(A)X×Y × ∆(B)X×Y induces a Markov chain over X × Y ,
which may have recurrent classes or transient states.
Definition 4.3. A subset C of X × Y is said to be a joint maximal communicating set if
i) There exists a pair of stationary strategies in ∆(A)X×Y × ∆(B)X×Y such that C is
a recurrent class of the induced Markov chain on X × Y .
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ii) C is maximal, i.e., if there exists C ′ a subset of X ×Y such that i) holds forC ′ and
C ⊆ C ′, then C ′ = C .
Advantageously, maximal communicating sets and joint maximal communicating sets
match in following sense.
Proposition 4.4. The joint maximal communicating sets are X ×C1, . . . ,X ×CL , and the
set of states that are transient under any pair (µ,ν ) of stationary strategies is X × D.
Proof. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , L}. X ×Ci is a recurrent class in X × Y for some pair of stationary
policies of player 1 on X and player 2 on Y (just take the stationary policy of player 2 on
Y associated to Ci and any stationary policy of player 1 on X ).
Let us show that X ×Ci is maximal. Suppose that there exists a subsetC of X ×Y such
thatC is a recurrent class under a pair of stationary strategies (µ,ν ) ∈ ∆(A)X×Y ×∆(B)X×Y
and X ×Ci ⊆ C .
Let C ′ = {y ∈ Y | ∃x ∈ X (x ,y) ∈ C} be the projection of C over Y . For all y ∈ C ′,
define Cy = {x ∈ X | (x ,y) ∈ C}. Finally, define ν ∈ ∆(B)Y by, for all y ∈ C ′
ν (y) = 1|Cy |
∑
x ∈Cy
ν (x ,y),
and arbitrarily outside C ′.
C ′ is closed under ν and every state in C ′ is accessible from any other state. Hence C ′
is a recurrent class. Thus C ′ ⊆ Ci , and C = X ×Ci .
Clearly X × D = X × Y \
(
L⋃
i=1
X ×Ci
)
is the set of transient states. 
4.2. The auxiliary games over each maximal communicating set. Consider now
a family of L zero-sum product stochastic games (Γi )i ∈{1, ...,L }. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , L}, if
y ∈ Ci , define the set of actions of player 2 at state y under which the state has probability
1 of staying in Ci ,
By = {b ∈ B | q(Ci |y,b) = 1}.
We remark that the set By is closed. Then the game Γi is given by
Γi = (X ,Ci ,A, (By)y∈Ci ,p,q,u).
The sets of strategies for player 1 and player 2 in Γi are respectively denoted Si and T i .
The value of the N -stage game starting at (x ,y) ∈ X ×Ci , is denoted viN (x ,y).
In Lemma 4.5 and Proposition 4.6 below we prove that each of these games have a
uniform value that does not depend on the initial state of the game in X ×Ci .
Lemma 4.5. Let vi : X ×Ci → [0, 1] be any uniform limit point of the sequence (viN )N ≥1.
Then vi is constant over X ×Ci .
Proof. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , L} and (x∗1 ,y∗1) ∈ argmaxX×Ci vi (·). Since player 1 has the strong
communication property
∀t ≥ T ∀x ′ ∈ X ∀σ ∈ S x
∗
1
σ (XT = x ′) > 0, (4.1)
and since Ci is a maximal communicating set
∃ν ∈ ∆(B)Y ∀y′ ∈ Ci ∃t ≥ T y
∗
1
ν (Yt = y′) > 0. (4.2)
We now fix (x ′,y′) ∈ X × Ci and let ν ∈ ∆(B)Y and t ≥ T be as in statement (4.2). We
denote (x∗t ,y∗t ) = (x ′,y′). Then there exist y∗2 , ...,y∗t−1 ∈ Ci such that
q(y∗t |y∗t−1,ν (y∗t−1)) . . .q(y∗2 |y∗1,ν (y∗1)) > 0.
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Passing to the limit (uniformly) in the Shapley equation (Eq. (2.1)) one has
v
i (x∗1 ,y∗1) = max
µ1∈∆(A)
min
ν1∈∆(By∗
1
)
∑
x2∈X
y2∈Ci
p(x2 |x∗1 , µ1)q(y2 |y∗1 ,ν1)vi (x2,y2).
Hence
v
i (x∗1 ,y∗1) ≤ max
µ1∈∆(A)
∑
x2∈X
y2∈Ci
p(x2 |x∗1 , µ1)q(y2 |y∗1,ν (y∗1))vi (x2,y2) ≤ vi (x∗1,y∗1).
Thus there exists µ∗1 ∈ ∆(A) such that
v
i (x∗1 ,y∗1) =
∑
x2∈X
y2 ∈Ci
p(x2 |x∗1 , µ∗1)q(y2 |y∗1,ν (y∗1))vi (x2,y2).
Finally there exists µ∗
1
∈ ∆(A) such that
v
i (x∗1 ,y∗1) =
∑
x2∈X
p(x2 |x∗1 , µ∗1)vi (x2,y∗2).
Let k ∈ {2, . . . , t − 1} and suppose there exist µ∗
1
∈ ∆(A) and µ∗
2
, . . . , µ∗
k−1 ∈ ∆(A)X such
that
v
i (x∗1,y∗1) =
∑
x2, ...,xk−1∈X
p(xk−1 |xk−2, µ∗k−2) . . . p(x2 |x∗1 , µ∗1)vi (xk−1,y∗k−1).
Then there exist µ∗
1
∈ ∆(A) and µ∗
2
, . . . , µ∗
k−1 ∈ ∆(A)X such that
v
i (x∗1 ,y∗1) ≤
∑
x2, ...,xk−1∈X
p(xk−1 |xk−2, µ∗k−2) . . . p(x2 |x∗1 , µ∗1)
max
µk−1∈∆(A)
min
νk−1∈∆(By∗
k−1
)
∑
xk ∈X
yk ∈Ci
p(xk |xk−1, µ∗k−1)q(yk |y∗k−1,νk−1)vi (xk ,yk )
≤
∑
x2, ...,xk−1∈X
p(xk−1 |xk−2, µ∗k−2) . . . p(x2 |x∗1 , µ∗1)
max
µk−1∈∆(A)
∑
xk ∈X
yk ∈Ci
p(xk |xk−1, µ∗k−1)q(yk |y∗k−1,ν (y∗k−1))vi (xk ,yk )
≤ vi (x∗1 ,y∗1).
Thus there exists µ∗
k
∈ ∆(A)X such that
v
i (x∗1,y∗1) =
∑
x2, ...,xk−1∈X
p(xk−1 |xk−2, µ∗k−2) . . .p(x2 |x∗1 , µ∗1)∑
xk ∈X
yk ∈Ci
p(xk |xk−1, µ∗k−1)q(yk |y∗k−1,ν (y∗k−1))vi (xk ,yk ).
Finally,
v
i (x∗1 ,y∗1) =
∑
x2, ...,xk−1,xk ∈X
p(xk |xk−1, µ∗k−1)p(xk−1 |xk−2, µ∗k−2) . . .
p(x2 |x∗1 , µ∗1)vi (xk ,y∗k ).
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Thus by induction, there exist µ∗
1
∈ ∆(A) and µ∗
2
, . . . , µ∗t−1 ∈ ∆(A)X such that for all
x2, . . . , xt−1 ∈ X
0 = p(x∗t |xt−1, µ∗k−1(xt−1)) . . .p(x3 |x2, µ∗2(x2))p(x2 |x∗1 , µ∗1)(vi (x∗t ,y∗t ) − vi (x∗1,y∗1)).
Let us define the policy σ ∈ S by σ1(x∗1) = µ∗1 and for allk ∈ {2, . . . , t−1} σk (h1k ) = µ∗k (xk ).
Finally σ is defined arbitrarily for all k ≥ t . We have from statement (4.1) that there exists
x∗
2
, . . . , x∗t−1 ∈ X such that
p(x∗t |x∗t−1, µ∗t−1) . . .p(x∗2 |x∗1 , µ∗1) > 0.
Finally, one has vi (x∗t ,y∗t ) = vi (x∗1,y∗1). 
Since any uniform limit point of (vi
N
)N ≥1 is constant over X ×Ci , we show that players
guarantee lim supN→+∞ v
i
N
by playing an ε-optimal Markov N0-periodic strategy for a
sufficiently large N0.
Proposition 4.6. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , L} the game Γi has a uniform value vi∞, which is
constant over X ×Ci .
Moreover, for all ε > 0 there exists N0 ∈ ∗ such that both players have an ε-optimal
Markov N0-periodic strategy in each Γi .
Proof. Here we take vi = lim supN→+∞ v
i
N
. Let ε > 0. Thanks to Lemma 4.5, there exists
N i
0
≥ 1 such that for all (x ,y) ∈ X ×Ci one has |viN i
0
(x ,y) − vi | ≤ ε . Hence
max
σ ∈Si
min
τ ∈T i

x,y
σ ,τ

N i
0∑
n=1
un
 ≥ N i0 (vi − ε).
Recall that there exists a Markov strategy σ i = (σ in)n∈[1,N i
0
], independent of the initial
state (x ,y), such that for all τ ∈ Ti

x,y
σ i ,τ

N i
0∑
n=1
un
 ≥ N i0(vi − ε).
Let N = pN i
0
+r , p ≥ 1 and r ≤ N i
0
−1 be two integers. The followingMarkov N0-periodic
strategy is still denoted σ i : at stage n ≥ 1, in state (x ,y) ∈ X ×Ci , play σ in′(x ,y), where
n′ equals n modulo N i
0
. Then for all τ ∈ Ti

x,y
σ i ,τ
[
N∑
n=1
un
]
=
p−1∑
k=0

x,y
σ i ,τ

(k+1)N i
0∑
n=kN i
0
+1
un
 + x,yσ i ,τ

N∑
n=pN i
0
+1
un

≥ pN i0 (vi − ε).
Finally, for all N ≥ N
i
0
ε
,
v
i
N (x ,y) ≥
pN i
0
(vi − ε)
N
≥ (1 − ε)(vi − ε).
That is, player 1 uniformly guarantees vi and σ i is an ε-optimal Markov N i
0
-periodic
strategy. A similar proof shows that player 2 also uniformly guarantees vi and has an
ε-optimal Markov N i
0
-periodic strategy τ i .
Note that N i
0
can be taken uniformly over {1, . . . , L} by setting N0 =
∏L
i=1 N
i
0
. 
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4.3. The auxiliaryMarkov decisionprocessG. Consider theMarkov decision process
G = (Y ,B,q,д), in which player 2 is the only decision maker and his aim is to minimize
д : Y → [0, 1]
y 7→
{
v
i∞ if there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , L} such that y ∈ Ci
1/2 if y ∈ D.
Recall, see (Sorin, 2002), that, G has a uniform value w∞ ∈ [0, 1]Y and that for every
ε > 0, player 2 has an ε-optimal stationary policy.
The interpretation is the following. The objective of player 2 is to reach the maximal
communicating set Ci with corresponding auxiliary game Γi having the lowest uniform
value vi∞ possible, and stay in Ci . Note that the payoff of 1/2 in D is arbitrary and does
not change the value of w∞.
We will prove that the uniform value w∞ of theMDP G is in fact also the uniform value
of the initial game Γ.
4.4. Player 2 uniformly guarantees w∞ in Γ.
Proposition 4.7. Player 2 uniformly guarantees w∞ in Γ.
To prove Proposition 4.7, we show that player 2 has an ε-optimal strategy which has
a rather simple structure: play according to some ε-optimal stationary policy in G on
Y , until reaching a recurrent class of the induced Markov chain on Y . Then switch to
an ε-optimal Markov periodic strategy in some game Γi having the property that the
state remains in the corresponding maximal communicating set Ci (indeed the ε-optimal
strategies used in the proof of Proposition 4.7 below can be taken Markov periodic thanks
to Proposition 4.6).
Proof. Let ε > 0, and let νG be an ε-optimal stationary policy of player 2 in G. νG induces
l recurrent classes R1, . . . ,Rl over Y . Moreover, by Definition 4.1, there exists a mapping
φ : {1, . . . , l} → {1, . . . , l} such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l}, Ri ⊆ Cφ(i ).
For all i ∈ {1, . . . , L} define Ti = min{n ∈ ∗ | Yn ∈ Ri } to be the hitting time of Ri by
(Yn)n∈∗ . The minimum over an empty set is taken equal to +∞.
We now consider the game Γ with initial state (x ,y) ∈ X ×Y . Let us define the strategy
τ ∈ T of player 2 as follows. Until there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , l} such that the state of player
2 is in Ri play νG . Let n ∈ ∗ be the first stage at which the state of player 2 reaches one of
the recurrent classes Ri , i ∈ {1, . . . , l}. From stage n on, play τφ(i ) which is an ε-optimal
strategy in Γφ(i ).
Let σ be any strategy of player 1 in Γ. Remark that under (σ ,τ ), the laws of the Ti ’s
are the same as under νG .
Let N ≥ 2,
1
N

x,y
σ ,τ
[
N∑
n=1
un
]
=
1
N
l∑
i=1

x,y
σ ,τ
[(
Ti∑
n=1
un
)
1
(√
N > Ti = min
k ∈{1, ...,l }
Tk
)]
(4.3)
+
1
N
l∑
i=1

x,y
σ ,τ
[(
N∑
n=Ti+1
un
)
1
(√
N > Ti = min
k ∈{1, ...,l }
Tk
)]
(4.4)
+
1
N
l∑
i=1

x,y
σ ,τ
[(
N∑
n=1
un
)
1
(√
N ≤ Ti = min
k ∈{1, ...,l }
Tk
)]
. (4.5)
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Since the payoffs un are at most 1 and Ti is at most
√
N in the indicator function, (4.3) is
at most √
N
N
l∑
i=1

x,y
σ ,τ
(√
N > Ti = min
k ∈{1, ...,l }
Tk
)
,
which itself is at most l
√
N
N
which is smaller than ε for N large enough.
Remark that in (4.4), 1
N
≤ 1
N−Ti , hence this quantity is less than or equal to
l∑
i=1

x,y
σ ,τ
[
1
N −Ti
(
N∑
n=Ti+1
un
)
1
(√
N > Ti = min
k ∈{1, ...,l }
Tk
)]
,
the latter equals
l∑
i=1

x,y
σ ,τ
[
1
N −Ti
N∑
n=Ti+1
un
√N > Ti = mink ∈{1, ...,l }Tk
]

x,y
σ ,τ
(√
N > Ti = min
k ∈{1, ...,l }
Tk
)
.
Recall that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , L}, τ i is ε-optimal in Γi which has uniform value vi∞. For N
large enough the quantity above is less than or equal to
l∑
i=1
(
v
φ(i )
∞ + ε
)

y
νG
(
Ti = min
k ∈{1, ...,l }
Tk
)
,
because under (σ ,τ ), the laws of the Ti ’s are the same as under νG . And since νG is
ε-optimal in G,
∑l
i=1 v
φ(i )
∞ 
y
νG
(
Ti = mink ∈{1, ...,l }Tk
)
is less than or equal to w∞(y) + ε .
Finally, since the payoffs un are at most 1, (4.5) is less than or equal to
l∑
i=1

x,y
σ ,τ
(√
N ≤ Ti = min
k ∈{1, ...,l }
Tk
)
,
which is at most
l
y
νG
(√
N ≤ min
k ∈{1, ...,l }
Tk
)
,
which itself is less than ε for N large enough. 
4.5. Player 1 uniformly guarantees w∞ in Γ.
4.5.1. The auxiliary games (Γ˜i )i ∈{1, ...,L }. Let us fix ε > 0 and N0 ∈ ∗ accordingly as in
Proposition 4.6. Beware that the objects that we now introduce also depend on ε .
We constructL auxiliary games (Γ˜i )i ∈{1, ...,L }which are copies of the games (Γi )i ∈{1, ...,L }
with an additional clock keeping track of the time modulo N0. The state of player 2 on
Ci × [1,N0], where [1,N0] = {1, . . . ,N0}, moves on Ci as in Γi and on [1,N0] by adding 1
at each stage (and starting back to 1 when N0 + 1 is reached). For all i ∈ {1, . . . , L},
Γ˜i = (X ,Ci × [1,N0],A, (By)y∈Ci ,p, q˜,u),
and
q˜ : Ci × [1,N0] × (By )y∈Ci → ∆(Ci × [1,N0])
(y, t ,b) 7→ q(·|y,b) ⊗ δt+1,
where t is taken modulo N0 in δt+1 .
The purpose of these games is that they have the same uniform value as the Γi ’s, but ε-
optimal stationary strategies instead of ε-optimal Markov N0-periodic strategies. Indeed,
by Proposition 4.6, let σ i be an ε-optimal Markov N0-periodic strategy in Γi . Let µ˜
i be the
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following stationary strategy in Γ˜i : for all (x ,y, t) ∈ X ×Ci × [1,N0], µ˜i (x ,y, t) = σ it (x ,y).
This defines a stationary strategy of player 1 in Γ˜i which is ε-optimal.
Remark 4.2. Since we are dealing with Markov periodic strategies, one could think of
defining maximal communicating sets with regard to this class of strategies rather than
stationary strategies as in Definition 4.1. However the construction we propose here
appears to provide a simpler demonstration of player 1 uniformly guaranteeing w∞ in Γ.
4.5.2. The auxiliary game Γ˜. We now gather together the games Γ˜i into one game Γ˜. Let
Y˜ = Y × [1,N0]. The game Γ˜ is defined by Γ˜ =
(
X , Y˜ ,A,B,p, q˜,u
)
. Where q˜ is extended
on Y˜ × B as follows.
q˜ : Y˜ × B → ∆(Y˜ )
(y, t ,b) 7→ q˜(·|y, t ,b),
where q˜ (y′, t + 1|y, t ,b) = q(y′ |y,b) if there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , L} such that y,y′ ∈ Ci , and
t is taken modulo N0. q˜ (y′, 1|y, t ,b) = q(y′ |y,b) if there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , L} such that
y ∈ Ci and y′ < Ci , or y ∈ D. Otherwise q˜ (y′, t ′ |y, t ,b) = 0. In words, the clock on [1,N0]
is incremented as in the games Γ˜i as long as the state stays in Ci , and is reset to 1 when
the state jumps from oneCi to another or to a transient state, or from a transient state to
any other state.
Let S˜ and T˜ be the set of strategies of player 1 and 2 respectively in Γ˜. It is important
to note that any quantity guaranteed by a player in Γ˜ is also guaranteed in Γ.
The following lemma states that the Y component of a recurrent class in X × Y˜ cannot
have nonempty intersection with two different maximal communicating sets in Y .
Lemma 4.8. Let (µ˜, ν˜ ) be a pair of stationary strategies on X × Y˜ . Let R ⊆ X × Y˜ be a
recurrent class under (µ˜, ν˜ ). Then there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , L} such that R ⊆ X ×Ci × [1,N0].
Proof. Let R′ = {(x ,y) ∈ X × Y | ∃t ∈ [1,N0] (x ,y, t) ∈ R} be the projection of R over
X × Y . For all (x ,y) ∈ R′ let Rx,y = {t ∈ [1,N0] | (x ,y, t) ∈ R}.
Define the stationary strategies µ and ν on X × Y by, for all (x ,y) ∈ R′,
µ(x ,y) = 1|Rx,y |
∑
t ∈Rx ,y
µ˜(x ,y, t) and ν (x ,y) = 1|Rx,y |
∑
t ∈Rx ,y
ν˜(x ,y, t),
and arbitrarily outside R′. Under (µ,ν ), R′ is a recurrent class. Hence by Proposition 4.4
there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , L} such that R′ ⊆ X ×Ci . 
For all i ∈ {1, . . . , L}, let µ˜i be an ε-optimal stationary strategy of player 1 in Γ˜i . Define
the stationary strategy µ˜ of player 1 in Γ˜ as follows. For all (x ,y, t) ∈ X × Y˜
µ˜(x ,y, t) =
{
µ˜
i (x ,y, t) if there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , L} such that y ∈ Ci
arbitrary fixed action if y ∈ D.
In the game Γ˜, by Proposition 2.2, player 2 has a stationary strategy ν˜ ∈ ∆(B)X×Y˜ and
there exists M ∈ ∗ such that for all N ≥ M and all τ ∈ T˜
γN (µ˜, ν˜)(x ,y, t) ≤ γN (µ˜,τ )(x ,y, t) + ε .
The pair (µ˜, ν˜) induces a Markov chain on X × Y˜ with recurrent classes R1, . . . ,Rm .
By Lemma 4.8 there exists a mapping ψ : {1, . . . ,m} → {1, . . . , L} such that for all
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
Ri ⊆ X ×Cψ (i ) × [1,N0].
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For all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} we define T˜i = min{n ∈ ∗ | (Xn,Yn, tn) ∈ Ri } to be the hitting
time of Ri by (Xn,Yn, tn)n≥1.
Lemma 4.9. In the game Γ˜ starting at (x ,y, 1) ∈ X × Y˜ , player 1 uniformly guarantees
m∑
i=1
v
ψ (i )
∞ 
x,y,1
µ˜, ν˜
(
T˜i = min
k ∈{1, ...,m }
T˜k
)
− 3ε .
Proof. Let N ≥ 2 and ε ′ > 0,
1
N

x,y,1
µ˜, ν˜
[
N∑
n=1
un
]
≥
m∑
i=1
1
N

x,y,1
µ˜, ν˜
©­«
N∑
n=T˜i+1
un
ª®¬1
(√
N > T˜i = min
k ∈{1, ...,m }
T˜k
) .
This last quantity is equal to
m∑
i=1

x,y,1
µ˜, ν˜

N − T˜i
N
1
N − T˜i
©­«
N∑
n=T˜i+1
un
ª®¬1
(√
N > T˜i = min
k ∈{1, ...,m }
T˜k
) .
Since T˜i is taken less than
√
N in the indicator function, the latter is greater than
m∑
i=1
(
1 −
√
N
N
)

x,y,1
µ˜, ν˜

1
N − T˜i
N∑
n=T˜i+1
un
√N > T˜i = mink ∈{1, ...,m } T˜k 
× x,y,1
µ˜, ν˜
(√
N > T˜i = min
k ∈{1, ...,m }
T˜k
)
.
Recall that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , L}, µ˜i is ε-optimal in Γ˜i , which has value vi∞. Moreover,
conditionally on T˜i = mink ∈{1, ...,m } T˜k , from T˜i +1 on, player 2 only plays actions that are
in (By )y∈Ri , otherwise the state process on Y would have a positive probability of leaving
Cψ (i ) and Ri would not be a recurrent class. Hence for N large enough the quantity above
is greater than or equal to
m∑
i=1
(
1 −
√
N
N
) (
v
ψ (i )
∞ − ε
)

x,y,1
µ˜, ν˜
(√
N > T˜i = min
k ∈{1, ...,m }
T˜k
)
,
which, for N large enough is greater than
(1 − ε ′)
m∑
i=1
(
v
ψ (i )
∞ − ε
) (

x,y,1
µ˜, ν˜
(
T˜i = min
k ∈{1, ...,m }
T˜k
)
− ε ′
)
.
Hence there exists N˜ ∈ ∗ such that for all N ≥ N˜ and all τ ∈ T˜ ,
γN (µ˜,τ )(x ,y, 1) + ε ≥ (1 − ε ′)
m∑
i=1
v
ψ (i )
∞
(

x,y,1
µ˜, ν˜
(
T˜i = min
k ∈{1, ...,m }
T˜k
)
− ε ′
)
− ε(1 − ε ′).
Finally, for ε ′ small enough, the right-hand side is greater than
m∑
i=1
v
ψ (i )
∞ 
x,y,1
µ˜, ν˜
(
T˜i = min
k ∈{1, ...,m }
T˜k
)
− 2ε,
which concludes the proof. 
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To conclude, we prove that the payoff uniformly guaranteed (up to 3ε) by player 1 in
Γ˜ in Lemma 4.9 can be obtained by player 2 as a limit payoff in the MDP G, and hence is
greater than w∞, the uniform value of G.
Proposition 4.10. Player 1 uniformly guarantees w∞ in Γ.
Proof. By Lemma 4.9, in the game Γ˜ starting at (x ,y, 1) ∈ X × Y˜ player 1 uniformly
guarantees
m∑
i=1
v
ψ (i )
∞ 
x,y,1
µ˜, ν˜
(
T˜i = min
k ∈{1, ...,m }
T˜k
)
− 3ε .
In theMDPG, let τG be the following policy of player 2. At stage 1, play ν˜ (x ,y, 1), a new
state (y2, t2) ∈ Y˜ is selected according to q˜(·|y, 1, ν˜(x ,y, 1)). At stage 2, play ν˜ (x2,y2, t2)
where x2 ∈ X is selected according to p(·|x , µ˜(x ,y, 1)). A new state (y3, t3) ∈ Y˜ is selected
according to q˜(·|y2, t2, ν˜(x2,y2, t2)). Inductively at stage n > 2, play ν˜(xn,yn , tn) where
xn ∈ X is selected according to p(·|xn−1, µ˜(xn−1,yn−1, tn−1)).
τG has the following interpretation. Player 2 plays in G according to ν˜ ∈ ∆(B)X×Y˜ by
simulating at each stage a fictitious state of player 1 on X that follows µ˜ ∈ ∆(B)X×Y˜ . This
induces a fictitious hitting times T˜i ’s of the recurrent classes R1, . . . ,Rm .
Under τG the laws of the T˜i ’s are the same as under (µ˜, ν˜ ). After the process (Xn,Yn, tn)
has reached Ri , the payoff to player 2 in G is v
i
∞ at each stage.
Therefore, τG yields in G a limit payoff of
m∑
i=1
v
ψ (i )
∞ 
x,y,1
µ˜, ν˜
(
T˜i = min
k ∈{1, ...,m }
T˜k
)
.
Hence this quantity is greater than w∞(y).
Since in the initial game Γ starting at (x ,y), player 1 also uniformly guarantees
m∑
i=1
v
ψ (i )
∞ 
x,y,1
µ˜, ν˜
(
T˜i = min
k ∈{1, ...,m }
T˜k
)
− 3ε,
he uniformly guarantees w∞(y) − 3ε .
This is true for all ε > 0. Hence player 1 uniformly guarantees w∞ in Γ. 
5. Proof of Theorem 3.4
In Section 5.1 we present the weakly communicating on both sides zero-sum product
stochastic game used to prove Theorem 3.4. The example proposed shows that in weakly
communicating on both sides games, even if players can go from any state to any other
state of their component in finite time, they can make mistakes that are irreversible with
regards to the joint state. Section 5.2 is dedicated to the simplification of the Shapley
equations obtained for the weakly communicating on both sides game (Proposition 5.2).
Finally in Section 5.3 we show that the Shapley equations obtained after simplification
are also those of a simple game of perfect information, i.e., in each state only one player
controls the transition, with two absorbing and two non absorbing states. The latter game
does not have an asymptotic value (Lemmas 5.3–5.6).
5.1. A counterexample.
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5.1.1. State spaces and action sets. The state space of player 1 is X = {x ,y} × C8 where
C8 = /8. The state space of player 2 is Y = {x ′,y′} ×C ′8 where C ′8 = /8.
Let I = {0} ∪ {1/22n | n ≥ 1}, and J = [0, 1/4]. Let A = I × {−1,+1} ∪ {0, 1} × {0} and
B = J × {−1,+1} ∪ {0, 1} × {0} be the action sets of player 1 and 2 respectively.
It is essential that I , and therefore A, are not semi-algebraic. Indeed, since X and Y are
finite, and the transitions we define below are polynomial, if A and B were definable in
some o-minimal structure, the game would have a uniform value, see (Bolte et al., 2014,
Theorem 4).
5.1.2. Transitions. For i ∈ {x ,y} we denote by −i the element of {x ,y}\{i}.
In state (i,k) ∈ X if player 1 plays (α ,p) ∈ I × {−1,+1} then with probability 1−α −α2
the new state is (i,k+p), with probability α the new state is (−i,k+p), andwith probability
α2 the new state is (i,k − p) (see Fig. 4).
Still in state (i,k) ∈ X , if player 1 plays (α , 0) ∈ {0, 1}× {0}, then with probability 1−α
the state remains in (i,k) and with probability α the new state is (−i,k) (see Fig. 5).
Transitions for player 2 are analogous on Y .
x
y
α2
α
1 − α − α2
0
4
26
1
5 3
7
α
α2
1 − α − α2
Figure 4. Transition of player 1 when playing (α ,+1), α ∈ I in state (x, 2)
x
y
1 − α
α
0
4
26
1
5 3
7
α 1 − α
Figure 5. Transition of player 1 when playing (α , 0), α ∈ {0, 1} in state (x, 2)
Hence by playing (0,p), player 1 totally controls the dynamics on C8, and by playing
(α , 0) with α equal to 0 or 1 he totally controls the dynamics on {x ,y}. And likewise for
player 2.
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5.1.3. Payoffs. Let (i,k) ∈ X and (i ′,k ′) ∈ Y . We denote bydC8(k,k ′) the distance between
player 1 and 2 on the circle C8.
The payoff function u is defined as follows. If dC8(k,k ′) ≥ 3 then u((i,k), (i ′,k ′)) = 1.
If dC8(k,k ′) ≤ 1 then u((i,k), (i ′,k ′)) = 0. Otherwise, if dC8(k,k ′) = 2 then u is defined by
the following table:
u(·, ·) x ′ y′
x 0 1
y 1 0
The interpretation of the game is the following. Player 1 wants to maximize his dis-
tance to player 2 who wants to minimize his distance to player 1. If the distance between
them on the circle is at most 1 or at least 3, then their positions in {x ,y} and {x ′,y′} do
not matter. Whereas if the distance between them on the circle is equal to 2, then player
1 wants to be in x (resp. y) when player 2 is in y′ (resp. x ′).
Note also that if the distance between the players is at least 3 (resp. at most 1), then
player 1 (resp. player 2) can play such that the distance is always at least 3 (resp. at most
1), and this is optimal for him. Hence those joint states on X × Y act as absorbing states
with payoff 1 and 0 respectively.
5.1.4. Shapley equations. For p ∈ {−1, 0,+1} we denote as well p by the triplet
(p−1,p0,p+1) ∈ {0, 1}3 with p−1 = 1 if p = −1 and p−1 = 0 otherwise, and likewise for
p0 and p+1. We define similarly q = (q−1,q0,q+1).
Let (i,k) ∈ X and (i ′,k ′) ∈ Y be the initial states of player 1 and 2. By symmetry of the
game, we only consider the cases (i,k) ∈ {(x , 0), (x , 1), (x , 2), (x , 3), (x , 4)} and (i ′,k ′) ∈
{(x ′, 0), (y′, 0)}. Moreover, the joint state ((i,k), (i ′, 0)) is denoted (i, i ′,k).
Let λ ∈ (0, 1). Let xλ = vλ(x ,y′, 2) and yλ = vλ(x , x ′, 2). Clearly vλ(·, ·, 3) = vλ(·, ·, 4) =
1 and vλ(·, ·, 0) = vλ(·, ·, 1) = 0. xλ is the value of the game, played with mixed strategies,
where player 1 chooses (α ,p) ∈ A and player 2 chooses (β,q) ∈ B with payoff λ + (1 −
λ)h(xλ,yλ ,α ,p, β,q) where h(xλ,yλ ,α ,p, β,q) equals[ ((1 − α − α2)(1 − β − β2) + αβ + α2β2) (p−1q−1 + p+1q+1)
+ ((1 − α)(1 − β) + αβ)p0q0
+
((1 − α − α2)β2 + (1 − β − β2)α2) (p−1q+1 + p+1q−1)]xλ
+
[ ((1 − α − α2)β + (1 − β − β2)α ) (p−1q−1 + p+1q+1)
+ ((1 − α)β + (1 − β)α)p0q0 + (αβ2 + βα2)(p−1q+1 + p+1q−1)
]
yλ
+ α2(1 − β2)p−1q−1 + β2(1 − α2)p+1q+1 + (1 − α2)p+1q0 + α2p−1q0
+ β2p0q+1 + (1 − β2)p0q−1 + (1 − α2)(1 − β2)p+1q−1 + α2β2p−1q+1.
yλ is the value of the game, played with mixed strategies, where player 1 chooses
(α ,p) ∈ A and player 2 chooses (β,q) ∈ B with payoff (1 − λ)h(yλ, xλ,α ,p, β,q).
5.2. Simplification of (xλ)λ∈(0,1) and (yλ)λ∈(0,1). The aim of this section is to simplify
the expressions of xλ and yλ obtained in the previous section.
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Let λ ∈ (0, 1). It is clear that xλ > 0, therefore yλ > 0 because player 1 can play (α ,+1)
with α > 0 in (x , x ′, 2). Moreover player 2 can play (β,+1) with β > 0 in (x ,y′, 2) and it
is easy to check that xλ < 1.
Lemma 5.1. For all λ ∈ (0, 1) the following equations hold.
xλ > yλ (5.1)
yλ = (1 − λ) max(α ,p)∈A
(
α2(p−1 − p+1)yλ + αp+1(xλ − yλ) + p+1yλ
)
(5.2)
xλ = λ + (1 − λ) min(β,q)∈B
(
β2(q−1 − q+1)(xλ − 1) + βq+1(yλ − xλ) + q+1(xλ − 1) + 1
)
. (5.3)
The proof of Lemma 5.1 is postponed to Appendix A. In the next proposition, we show
that xλ and yλ indeed have a rather simple expression.
Proposition 5.2. For all λ ∈ (0, 1),
λyλ = (1 − λ)max
α ∈I
(−α2yλ + α(xλ − yλ)) (5.4)
λxλ = λ + (1 − λ)min
β ∈J
(
β2(1 − xλ) + β(yλ − xλ)
)
. (5.5)
The proof of Proposition 5.2 is postponed to Appendix A.
5.3. A simple counterexample to the convergence of (xλ)λ∈(0,1) and (yλ)λ∈(0,1).
Eqs. (5.4) and (5.5) are in fact the Shapley equations of the following game, non prod-
uct, non weakly communicating on both sides, described in Fig. 6. This game does not
have a product state space, neither has it a weakly communicating property. This exam-
ple was introduced by Renault (2019). The state space is Ω = {0, 1, 0∗, 1∗}. The action
space of player 1 (resp. 2) is I (resp. J ). Player 1 (resp. 2) plays in state 0 (resp. 1). The
states 0∗ and 1∗ are absorbing. The payoff in states 0 and 0∗ (resp. 1 and 1∗) is 0 (resp. 1).
0 1
0∗ 1∗
α2 β
2
α
β
1 − β − β21 − α − α2
Figure 6. A simpler game
We conclude with the next lemmas showing that (xλ)λ∈(0,1] and (yλ)λ∈(0,1] do not con-
verge. The proofs are provided for completeness.
Lemma 5.3. For all λ ≤ 1/17, βλ = xλ−yλ2(1−xλ ) is optimal for player 2. Moreover
4λ(1 − xλ)2 = (1 − λ)(xλ − yλ)2. (5.6)
Hence xλ − yλ goes to 0 as λ goes to 0.
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Proof. Suppose that βλ ≤ 1/4, then it is easy to verify that the lemma holds. Suppose now
that βλ > 1/4. Then the minimum in Eq. (5.5) is attained in 1/4. It yields
1
4
(1 − λ)(xλ − yλ) = (1 − xλ)
(
1 + 15λ
16
)
> (1 − λ)1 − xλ
8
.
Hence λ > 1/17. 
Let (λn)n∈∗ ∈ (0, 1]∗ such that λn → 0 as n goes to +∞.
Lemma 5.4. If (xλn )n and (yλn )n converge to v ∈ [0, 1], then v ≤ 1/2. Moreover xλn −yλn ∼
2
√
λn(1 − v) and βλn ∼
√
λn as n goes to +∞.
Proof. Let αλ be an optimal strategy of player 1. By Eq. (5.6) one gets
2αλ
√
λyλ ≤ yλ(1 + α2λ) = λyλα2λ + 2αλ
√
λ
√
1 − λ(1 − xλ).
Dividing by αλ
√
λ and passing to the limit yields v ≤ 1/2. 
In the next two lemmas, we show that the game does not have an asymptotic value.
The idea is the following: player 1 would like to play in the λ-discounted game some α
close to
√
λ 1−v
v
in state 0, where v is the limit (up to some subsequence) of (xλn )n and
(yλn )n . If player 1 is not allowed to take any absorbing risk in [0, 1/4], but player 2 is, we
expect the values (xλn )n and (yλn )n to oscillate.
Lemma 5.5. If for all n ∈ ∗, √λn ∈ I then
lim
n→+∞xλn = 1/2.
Proof. Assume that, up to some subsequence, (xλn )n and (yλn )n converge to some v ∈
[0, 1]. If player 1 plays α =
√
λ, Eq. (5.4) yields
λyλ ≥ (1 − λ)
√
λ(xλ − yλ) − (1 − λ)λyλ .
Dividing by λ and passing to the limit, one gets v ≥ 1/2. By Lemma 5.4, v = 1/2. 
Lemma 5.6. If for all n ∈ ∗,
(
1/2√λn, 2
√
λn
)
∩ I = ∅ then lim supn→+∞ xλn ≤ 4/9.
Proof. Suppose that up to some subsequence, (xλn )n and (yλn )n converge to some v ≥ 4/9.
By Lemma 5.4 v ≤ 1/2. Let α∗
λ
=
xλ−yλ
2yλ
> 0 be the argument of the maximum of the
unconstrained problem associated to Eq. (5.4). Then α∗
λ
∼
√
λ 1−v
v
. Hence for λ small
enough in the sequence, 1/2
√
λ ≤ α∗
λ
≤ 2
√
λ.
The open interval
(
1/2√λn, 2
√
λn
)
does not contain any point in I . Furthermore the
objective function of player 1 is increasing between 0 and α∗
λ
, and decreasing after.
First case, αλ ≤ 1/2
√
λ. Then
λyλ ≤ 1/2(1 − λ)
√
λ(xλ − yλ) − 1/4(1 − λ)λyλ .
Dividing by λ and passing to the limit yields v ≤ 4/9.
Second case, αλ ≥ 2
√
λ. Then
λyλ ≤ 2(1 − λ)
√
λ(xλ − yλ) − 4(1 − λ)λyλ,
and again v ≤ 4/9. 
Thus taking the sequences λn =
1
22n
and λ′n =
1
22n+1
, for all n ≥ 1, one has from
Lemmas 5.5 and 5.6 that (xλ)λ∈(0,1] and (yλ)λ∈(0,1] do not converge as λ goes to 0.
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Appendix A. Omitted proofs
Proof of Lemma 5.1. We consider the game starting in state (x , x ′, 2). Player 2 can play
(β,q) = (0,+1), hence
yλ ≤ (1 − λ) max(α ,p)∈A
(
α2(p−1 − p+1)yλ + αp+1(xλ − yλ) + p+1yλ
)
.
Suppose
{0} ∈ argmax
p
(
max
α ∈{0,1}
(
α2(p−1 − p+1)yλ + αp+1(xλ − yλ) + p+1yλ
) )
.
Then yλ ≤ (1 − λ)maxα ∈{0,1} 0, hence yλ = 0, contradiction.
Suppose
{−1} ∈ argmax
p
(
max
α ∈I
(
α2(p−1 − p+1)yλ + αp+1(xλ − yλ) + p+1yλ
))
.
Then yλ ≤ (1 − λ)maxα ∈I α2yλ = 1−λ16 yλ . Thus yλ = 0, contradiction.
Thus
argmax
p
(
max
α
(
α2(p−1 − p+1)yλ + αp+1(xλ − yλ) + p+1yλ
) )
= {+1}.
Hence λyλ ≤ (1 − λ)maxα ∈I
(−α2 + α(xλ − yλ)) . Thus xλ > yλ , and Eq. (5.1) is proved.
To prove Eq. (5.2), we show that (0,+1) is a dominant strategy of player 2, i.e.,
∀(α ,p) ∈ A ∀(β,q) ∈ B h(yλ , xλ,α ,p, β,q) − h(yλ , xλ,α ,p, 0,+1) ≥ 0.
There are 9 cases to test, corresponding to the different values of (p,q) ∈ {−1, 0,+1}2.
1st case: p+1 = q+1 = 1.((1 − α − α2)(−β − β2) + αβ + α2β2) yλ+((1 − α − α2)β + (−β − β2)α ) xλ + β2(1 − α2)
=
((1 − 2α − α2 − αβ)(xλ − yλ) + β(1 − α2)(1 − yλ) + βα2yλ ) β ≥ 0.
2nd case: p+1 = q0 = 1. 1 − α2 ≥ 0
3rd case: p+1 = q−1 = 1.((1 − α − α2)β2 + (1 − β − β2)α2 − (1 − α − α2)) yλ+
(αβ2 + βα2 − α)xλ + (1 − α2)(1 − β2)
=
((β2 − 1)(1 − α − 2α2) − βα2) yλ+(
βα2 + α(β2 − 1)) xλ + (1 − α2)(1 − β2)
=βα2(xλ − yλ) + α(1 − β2)(1 − xλ)+
(1 − β2)(1 − α − α2)(1 − yλ) + (1 − β2)α2yλ ≥ 0
4th case: p0 = q+1 = 1. β
2 ≥ 0
5th case: p0 = q0 = 1.
((1 − α)(1 − β) + αβ)yλ + ((1 − α)β + (1 − β)α) xλ ≥ 0
6th case: p0 = q−1 = 1. 1 − β2 ≥ 0
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7th case: p−1 = q+1 = 1.((1 − α − α2)β2 + (1 − β − β2)α2 − α2) yλ + (α2β + αβ2)xλ + α2β2
=
((1 − α − α2)β2 + (−β − β2)α2) yλ + (α2β + αβ2)xλ + α2β2
=(1 − 2α2)β2yλ + (α2β + αβ2)(xλ − yλ) + α2β2 ≥ 0
8th case: p−1 = q0 = 1. α2 ≥ 0
9th case: p−1 = q−1 = 1.((1 − α − α2)(1 − β − β2) + αβ + α2β2 − α2) yλ+((1 − α − α2)β + (1 − β − β2)α ) xλ + α2(1 − β2)
=
((1 − α − α2)(1 − β − β2) + αβ ) yλ+((1 − α − α2)β + (1 − β − β2)α ) xλ + α2(1 − β2)(1 − yλ) ≥ 0
Eq. (5.2) is thus proved.
We now consider the game starting in state (x ,y′, 2). To prove Eq. (5.3), we show that
(0,+1) is a dominant strategy of player 1, i.e.,
∀(α ,p) ∈ A ∀(β,q) ∈ B h(xλ,yλ ,α ,p, β,q) − h(xλ,yλ , 0,+1, β,q) ≤ 0.
There are again 9 cases to test, corresponding to the different values of (p,q) ∈
{−1, 0,+1}2.
1st case: p+1 = q+1 = 1.((1 − α − α2)(1 − β − β2) + αβ + α2β2 − (1 − β − β2)) xλ+((1 − α − α2)β + (1 − β − β2)α − β ) yλ + β2(1 − α2) − β2
=
((−α − α2)(1 − β − β2) + αβ + α2β2) xλ+((−α − α2)β + (1 − β − β2)α ) yλ − α2β2
=α(1 − 2β − β2 − αβ)(yλ − xλ) − α2(1 − β2)xλ + α2β2(xλ − 1) ≤ 0.
2nd case: p+1 = q0 = 1. 1 − 1 ≤ 0
3rd case: p+1 = q−1 = 1.((1 − α − α2)β2 + (1 − β − β2)α2 − β2) xλ+
(αβ2 + βα2)yλ + (1 − α2)(1 − β2) − (1 − β2)
=
(
β2(−α − α2) + α2(1 − β − β2)) xλ + (βα2 + αβ2) yλ − α2(1 − β2)
=
(
βα2 + αβ2
) (yλ − xλ) + α2(1 − β2)(xλ − 1) − α2β2xλ ≤ 0
4th case: p0 = q+1 = 1. −(1 − β − β2)xλ − βyλ + β2 − β2 ≤ 0
5th case: p0 = q0 = 1.
((1 − α)(1 − β) + αβ) xλ + ((1 − α)β + (1 − β)α)yλ − 1
= ((1 − α)β + α(1 − β)) (yλ − xλ) + xλ − 1 ≤ 0
6th case: p0 = q−1 = 1. 1 − β2 − (1 − β2) − β2xλ ≤ 0
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7th case: p−1 = q+1 = 1.((1 − α − α2)β2 + (1 − β − β2)α2 − (1 − β − β2)) xλ+
(α2β + αβ2 − β)yλ + α2β2 − β2
=(α2 − 1)βyλ + αβ2(yλ − xλ)+
(1 − α2)(2β2 − 1)xλ + (α2 − 1)β(1 − xλ) ≤ 0
8th case: p−1 = q0 = 1. α2 − 1 ≤ 0
9th case: p−1 = q−1 = 1.((1 − α − α2)(1 − β − β2) + αβ + α2β2 − β2) xλ+((1 − α − α2)β + (1 − β − β2)α ) yλ + α2(1 − β2) − (1 − β2)
=
((1 − α − α2)β + (1 − β − β2)α ) (yλ − xλ)+
β2(α2 − 1)xλ + (1 − α2)(1 − β2)(xλ − 1) ≤ 0
Thus Eq. (5.3) is proved. 
Proof of Proposition 5.2. It has been seen in the proof of Lemma 5.1 that
argmax
p
(
max
α
(
α2(p−1 − p+1)yλ + αp+1(xλ − yλ) + p+1yλ
) )
= {+1}.
Thus one deduces Eq. (5.4). Likewise,
argmin
q
(
min
β
(
β2(q−1 − q+1)(xλ − 1) + βq+1(yλ − xλ) + p+1yλ
) )
= {+1}.
And Eq. (5.5) is proved. 
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